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ABSTRACT 
When the United States Government faces a threat from 
an unconventional and asymmetric terrorist group, one 
possible counterterrorism strategy is leadership targeting.  
The value of leadership targeting is based on the 
expectation of a quick and cheap victory over the enemy by 
removing the leader from the organization and on a minimal 
expenditure of assets and resources to achieve these 
results.  
This study will argue that leadership targeting may be 
an effective strategy, but only under specific conditions.  
It is critical to the security of the United States, for 
strategic and operational planners, policy makers, and 
executives, to understand the appropriate environment for 
undertaking a leadership targeting strategy.  This study 
provides a framework for analyzing the effectiveness of 
leadership targeting based on critical components of 
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I. INTRODUCTION   
A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a framework 
to analyze the effectiveness of leadership targeting.  By 
applying a case study of Abu Musab al Zarqawi to the 
leadership targeting model, presented by Dr. Michael 
Freeman and Dr. Gordon McCormick, the results may identify 
the optimal point to target terrorist leadership during a 
terrorist organizations development cycle.  By applying 
this model to current terrorist organizations, it may be 
possible to influence current strategy, doctrine 
development, and implementation, to better optimize limited 
resources, resulting in the destruction or marginalization 
of terrorist organizations.   
If the Freeman and McCormick model is useful in 
defining critical stages of a terrorist organization, the 
application of leadership decapitation may increase in its 
effectiveness.  Intuitively, a decapitation strategy will 
experience more success if the leader is critical to the 
organization.  The expectation is that if a leader is 
central to the development of the group’s ideology as well 
as guiding its operations, decapitation of that source 
should result in a significant degradation of the 
organization’s capabilities. Conversely, as a leader 
decentralizes operations and ideology, the organization 
becomes less vulnerable to the loss of the leader. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question  
The primary question this analysis will attempt to 
answer is: When is leadership targeting, or decapitation, 
2 
an effective strategy in countering terrorist 
organizations?  By applying the basic principles of the 
terrorist leadership targeting model, alternative 
counterterrorist solutions may become evident.  Even though 
decapitation has proven successful under certain 
conditions, it should not be a default counterterrorism 
strategy of the U.S. government and military.   
The leadership targeting model may prove more 
effective as a framework to facilitate a better 
understanding of how central and critical a leader is to an 
organization before determining a counterterrorism 
strategy.   
Ultimately, by providing an answer to the research 
question and providing a case study as a framework, 
intelligence analysts will be able to more accurately 
predict the effects of a decapitation strategy.  If 
analysts can reliably and accurately predict effects, they 
will be enabled to make valuable recommendations to 
strategic and operational planners resulting in the 
judicious and effective application of valuable and limited 
resources. 
2. Associated Research Questions 
In addition to the primary purpose of the thesis, 
answers to other related questions might become evident.  
Specifically, is targeting leaders worth the cost?  Based 
on the application of the model as well as a critical 
analysis of the information, it may become evident that the 
benefits of a decapitation strategy may not outweigh the 
costs associated with pursuing this type of strategy.   
The Freeman/McCormick model identifies two primary 
variables and several sub components for consideration when 
3 
framing the value of a leader.  Through the application of 
the case study, other critical leadership characteristics 
may become evident that are not addressed by the current 
model.  If unaddressed variables become evident, they may 
be incorporated into the model in order to improve the 
predictive capabilities and vulnerabilities of terrorist 
leadership. 
Finally, can the model be applied and operationalized?  
If the model can be applied it may lead analysts, 
strategists, and planners, to allocate limited resources in 
a more effective manner that has a greater impact on the 
marginalization or destruction of developing terrorist 
organizations. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This study will use a case study of Abu Musab Al-
Zarqawi and will analyze the development of the 
organization over time.  A method of difference will be 
used in order to identify significant changes in the 
organization throughout, ultimately identifying critical 
points of vulnerability within the organization.  
By using a method of difference, a comparison of the 
three phases will identify differences in the organizations 
ideology, tactics, targets, demonstrated operational 
control, rhetoric, media statements, and factors of 
charisma and influence.  Because charisma is a difficult 
variable to quantify and is even more difficult to 
determine due to its innate and ambiguous characteristics, 
evaluating Zarqawi’s charisma and how it evolved, 
strengthened, or dissipated will be difficult to quantify.  
In order to address this concern a qualitative analysis 
based on available reporting will be used determine the 
4 
level of charismatic influence.  The qualitative analysis 
should determine subtle differences in Zarqawi’s 
charismatic qualities throughout the development of the 
organization. The analysis will cover three phases of 
Zarqawi’s life, the scope of which are described, in brief, 
below.  
1. Phase I, Early Experience and Radicalization of 
Zarqawi: Adolescence to Afghanistan 
The first phase consists of Zarqawi’s adolescent 
years, his first trip to Afghanistan to participate in the 
anti-Soviet Jihad, his return to Jordan, and subsequent 
incarceration in the Jordanian prison system.  This phase 
ends with Zarqawi’s release from prison and his return to 
Pakistan. 
2. Phase II, Zarqawi’s Early Organizations and 
Affiliations: From Prison to the Defeat of the 
Taliban 
The second phase of analysis begins with Zarqawi’s 
return to Afghanistan after his release from prison in 
Jordan.  This phase includes Zarqawi’s early operational 
experience and his establishment and implementation of his 
training camp in Herat, Afghanistan.  This phase of 
analysis concludes with the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan 
and Zarqawi’s eventual escape to the Kurdish areas of 
Northern Iraq and Iran. 
3. Phase III, The Zarqawi Network in Iraq: From 
Herat to Death 
The third phase focuses on Zarqawi’s operations in 
Iraq after the U.S. invasion.  This phase includes an 
analysis of the network after a formal declaration from Abu 




and formal allegiance to Usama Bin Laden and the core Al 
Qaeda.  This phase ends in June 2006 with the death of al 
Zarqawi.  
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this work will be limited to one case 
study, Abu Musab al Zarqawi as the leader of al-Qaeda in 
Iraq, and its application to the terrorist leadership 
targeting model.  The use of a single case may create some 
concerns with regard to case bias, or selection. As 
previously discussed, appropriate measures will be 
implemented in order to mitigate this concern.  At the 
conclusion of this study, additional research may be 
required to further develop a coherent and sustainable 
counterterrorism strategy recommendation.  In particular, 
this study will not address assassinations, state 
leadership targeting, or the legal or moral issues 
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II. FREEMAN AND MCCORMICK MODEL 
A. OVERVIEW  
The model being developed by Freeman and McCormick 
studies the effectiveness of terrorist leadership targeting 
as a political-military strategy for defeating terrorist 
organizations. The authors argue that throughout history 
militaries have used enemy leadership targeting as a 
shortcut to victory assuming that the leader of an 
organization is critical to the success of the 
organization. Thus, if a leadership targeting strategy is 
successful, the organization will experience a loss of 
effectiveness, and the organization may be defeated more 
rapidly than expected. In other words, in pursuing a 
leadership targeting strategy, an opponent is looking for a 
“cheap” victory with reduced costs and avoidance of a 
protracted struggle. Obviously, the more critical a leader 
is to an organization, the more vulnerable that 
organization becomes at the loss of that leader. Freeman 
and McCormick conclude, however, that this strategy is not 
always effective and that the removal of a leader is not 
necessarily an effective strategy. That conclusion makes it 
even more important to determine and understand the times 
and circumstances when and why the strategy is effective. 
These questions are the basis of their study’s argument.1 
1. What is Leadership Targeting? 
For the purposes of this thesis, leadership targeting 
refers essentially to military operations designed to 
capture or kill the leader of a terrorist organization. 
                     
1 The current paper being produced by Freeman and McCormick is 
unpublished at this time.  The document in its entirety, with complete 
explanation of leadership targeting, will be forthcoming.  For the 
purpose of this paper, the unpublished version is referenced.   
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Although in this case study, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was 
killed by the U.S. military, the thesis will not 
differentiate between the effectiveness of kill versus 
capture operations. For our purposes, both meet the 
definition of leadership targeting. Throughout the thesis, 
the term “leadership targeting” will be used 
interchangeably with the term “decapitation.” The 
discussions will focus on the decapitation of Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, the leader of the terrorist organization, Al Qaeda 
in Iraq.  
2. Why Decapitation? 
A successful leadership targeting strategy that 
results in the killing or capture of a targeted terrorist 
leader could result in a quick and decisive victory for the 
state or state organization using the strategy. The 
prospect of a quick and decisive victory is appealing 
politically and therefore is often encouraged or supported 
as a strategy for success. Throughout history, there are 
numerous examples of successful leadership targeting. These 
instances of success are what fuels current politics and 
encourages the continued use of this strategy in the hope 
of a quick, cheap, and decisive victory.2  However, the 
successful killing or capture of a terrorist leader does 
not always result in the defeat of his organization. To 
maintain a more effective campaign against terrorism, 
therefore, it is important to determine and understand what 
circumstances make leadership targeting the most effective 
strategy to use. 
                     
2 Specific examples of successful leadership targeting are discussed 
by Cronin in “How Al-Qaeda ends”.  Cronin cites several cases of 
successful leadership targeting, including Peru’s Shining Path, the 
Kurdistan Workers Party, the Real Irish Republican Army, and Japan’s 
Aum Shinrikyo and numerous others. 
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3. What Makes a Leader Important to an Organization? 
In the Freeman and McCormick model the authors 
indicate that the value of a leader can be broadly 
categorized according to two primary variables: operational 
leadership and inspirational leadership. Though these two 
variables are the model’s primary components, each is 
composed of several associated sub-components. 
B. INSPIRATIONAL LEADERSHIP VARIABLE 
The model’s first broad variable is what Freeman and 
McCormick refer to as “inspirational leadership variable”: 
a combination of the leader’s charismatic attributes as 
well as his/her contributions to the ideology of the group, 
particularly issues of legitimacy of the group’s goals and 
means.”3  A more detailed description of both variables and 
their sub-components follows. 
A key element in the leadership targeting strategy is 
to effectively target a leader at a point when the success 
and continued virility of the organization is largely 
dependent upon the continued inspirational leadership of 
this one individual. It is generally assumed that the 
inspirational variable of leadership will be more difficult 
to replicate in the early stages of an organization. Thus, 
it is key to an effective decapitation strategy to 
interdict the leader before he is able to socialize and 
institutionalize his inspiration within the organization. 
Once this inspiration becomes institutionalized, the 
organization will be less dependent on the unitary leader 
and, therefore, less vulnerable to his decapitation.4  
                      
3 Michael Freeman and Gordon McCormick, Leadership Targeting of 




One variable on the inspirational spectrum is 
charisma. Generally speaking, the charisma factor is what 
enables grass-roots collective actions to form around a 
single individual who provides a population with an 
alternative to the status quo. Theoretically, the 
importance of charisma to the leadership targeting strategy 
is that, for an organization to gain a following and act in 
open confrontation with the state, it must first develop a 
base or core of disciples.  The disciples put all of their 
faith in the ability of the leader.  
To determine the importance of charisma in the Al-
Qaeda case study, it is necessary first to identify what 
charismatic qualities Zarqawi demonstrated, how he 
leveraged those characteristics to develop a tightly 
networked and cohesive terrorist organization, and how he 
transitioned through multiple phases to meet the 
organization’s needs.   
To attain his goals of a caliphate and the 
implementation of Islamic sharia law, Zarqawi had to 
develop a revolutionary core group of disciples. He had to 
gain sufficient strength in numbers that would enable him 
to overtly attack the enemy (in this case, the West), the 
apostate regime of Jordan, other secular Arab nations in 
the region, the Zionist state of Israel, and the Shi’a 
Muslim population. To inspire this core of devoted 
followers, Zarqawi had to convince them he was providing 
the leadership required to overcome a “situation of intense 
social crisis.”5 By leveraging his previous experiences, 
                     
5 Michael Freeman and Gordon McCormick, Leadership Targeting of 
Terrorist Groups: A Strategic Assessment, ed. unpublished. 
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imprisonment in Jordan, and combat experience in 
Afghanistan, Zarqawi presented an initially inspirational 
and charismatic personality that offered a solution to the 
social crisis at hand, the invasion of U.S. forces.   
One of the defining characteristics of charismatic 
influence is the ability to encourage individuals to 
participate in a collective action that requires personal 
sacrifice and places the individual in danger. Indeed, the 
ability to get others to put themselves in grave danger for 
what is presented as the “greater good” and to act “less 
than individually rational” is close to a definition of 
what charismatic leadership amounts to.6 To experience 
success as he did in organizing several fundamentally 
different organizations, Zarqawi had to not only leverage 
all the charismatic variables described in Freeman and 
McCormick’s model, but also provide an ideology that 
justified the group’s radical position.  
2. Ideology 
Ideology is another component of the inspirational 
variable. To explain it, Freeman and McCormick address four 
questions associated with ideology: What is the problem? 
Who is the enemy? What is the solution? What are the means?  
In determining the answers to these questions, the 
basic framework of most ideologies is revealed. A leader 
that can convince a group of followers to agree that they 
face a problem and can establish the source of the problem 
has, in effect, the initial ingredients for inculcating an 
ideology. Once a leader generates enough interest and 
support for an issue and encourages his followers to agree 
                     
6 Michael Freeman and Gordon McCormick, Leadership Targeting of 
Terrorist Groups: A Strategic Assessment, ed. unpublished. 
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on the source of the problem, he can then determine how to 
legitimately resolve it. Once the problem, the source, and 
the potential solution are determined, the organization can 
then define what methods will be most legitimate. In most 
cases such as those of Zarqawi, the solution is to attack, 
either directly or indirectly, the source of the problem.  
C. OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP VARIABLE 
In the Freeman-McCormick model, the operational 
leadership variable is composed of three components, 
strategy, tactics and organizational factors; each is 
discussed in detail below.  
As with the inspirational leadership variable, if the 
ability to make good operational decisions is vested in a 
single person with the requisite skills, and there is no 
apparent successor with similar operational experience, the 
expectation is that with the killing or capture of the 
leader, the organization will lose or have a diminished 
operational capacity.  
1. The Strategic Factor 
A strategy is the conceptual framework that guides an 
organization’s operations. In the case of Zarqawi, the 
strategic choices involved were the decisions to use 
violence over politics, identifying the near enemy rather 
than the far enemy, the decision to instigate civil war 
between the Sunni and Shia, as well as the decision to 
attack civilians.  
2. The Tactical Factor 
Tactically, the operational leader decides what is 
attacked, when, and how.   Part of Zarqawi’s strategy in 
Iraq was to foment civil war.  The strategic decision to 
engage in civil war had to be operationalized. For example, 
13 
Zarqawi used the attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra to 
instigate sectarian violence and to foment civil war. The 
tactical considerations involved Zarqawi determining the 
target (the Golden Mosque), the timing (when probability of 
success is highest) and the method (suicide bomber) that he 
believed would ultimately facilitate, or instigate, a 
Sunni-Shia civil war.  
An operational leader is the one who decides when to 
attack.  At times, this is of particular importance at the 
tactical level. Thus, for example, Zarqawi eroded the 
security around Baghdad by repeatedly attacking civilian 
targets with suicide bombings. The exact timing of these 
attacks was critical only when attacks were coordinated to 
occur simultaneously to increase their dramatic effect. 
Also important in timing, the Madrid bombings in 2004, 
planned for the eve of a strategically important Spanish 
presidential election, were intended to influence voters. 
In this regard, they were highly successful, ultimately 
resulting in Spain withdrawing from the U.S. coalition in 
Iraq.7  
Finally, leaders determine the methods to be used. 
They have a range of options to choose from: 
assassinations, car bombs, suicide bombs, airplane 
hijackings, hostage-taking, weapons of mass destruction, 
etc. As with the choice of targets, the operational leader 
must choose which tactic has the best chance of success at 
the lowest cost. The selection of a particular method may 
serve various purposes. For example, Zarqawi used 
kidnappings and beheadings in Iraq to erode the political 
                     
7 Michael Freeman and Gordon McCormick, Leadership Targeting of 
Terrorist Groups: A Strategic Assessment, ed. unpublished.  
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and public will in support of the coalition.  An effective 
operational leader will take into account the potential 
secondary effects of each of these choices by considering 
how his supporters, opponents, and neutral observers will 
view the legitimacy of these actions.  
When an organization is explicitly dependent on the 
leader for all these aspects – selection of targets, 
tactics used, and timing – Freeman and McCormick theorize 
that the organization is thereby highly vulnerable to the 
use of a decapitation strategy. 
3. The Organizational Factors 
An organization’s ultimate success is inherently 
dependent on the leader’s ability to provide resources to 
the group. Some of the resources critical to a terrorist 
organization are logistical resources. However, perhaps 
even more important, are the personal ties established by 
the leader. If he has a well-developed network of 
associates that he can leverage through personal ties, a 
leader can provide required financial support, acquire new 
recruits, and arrange the underground transportation of 
individuals. Thus, the establishment of a sufficient 
support network is critical to the success of the 
organization and essential for the group’s growth in size 
and capacity. 
In addition to those logistical and personal 
resources, a leader must also possess the organizational 
skills necessary for effectively managing an evolving group 
of individuals. As long as the group remains relatively 
small, the leader can directly supervise all aspects of the 
organization. But as the organization grows in size and 
capacity, its complexity also expands relative to its size. 
15 
And as the organization becomes more complex, its success 
becomes more and more dependent on the leader’s ability to 
develop an appropriate and effective organizational 
structure.  
D. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
To illustrate the relationship between the 
inspirational and the operational variables, Freeman and 
McCormick developed the graphic model shown in Figure 1. 
The model is a two-dimensional representation. On the Y-






















Figure 1.   Freeman and McCormick Leadership Model 
(From: Freeman and McCormick, Leadership Targeting of 
Terrorist Groups: A Strategic Assessment) 
 
As described above, both variables are composed of 
several factors. In the illustration, the sub-components of 
each variable have been combined for visual simplicity. 
Thus the Y-axis shows inspirational leadership’s two sub-
16 
components: charisma and ideology. On the X-axis is the 
operational component, which comprises control over the 
organization’s strategy, tactics, and organizational 
design.   
The dotted lines in the figure divide the model into 
four quadrants, each of which characterizes a leadership 
type. The upper right quadrant (quadrant I) depicts a 
leader who is critical both inspirationally and 
operationally to the organization. The upper left quadrant 
(quadrant II) depicts a leader who has a lesser role in 
controlling operations, but who nonetheless remains 
significant in fulfilling the inspirational aspect of 
leadership. The lower right corner of the figure (quadrant 
III) shows a leader who is lacking in the inspirational 
aspect, but who remains operationally critical to the 
organization. The final quadrant (quadrant IV) reveals a 
leader who is not necessary for the organizations fails 
operations or inspiration. 
According to Freeman and McCormick, most leaders 
undergo a transition from quadrant I to quadrant IV as he 
institutionalizes both the operational and inspirational 
leadership. The model also visualizes a leader who has 
moved into quadrant IV but who, for whatever reason, sees a 
necessity to re-establish himself within the organization. 
Although Freeman and McCormick expect the declining leader 
to be the norm, they also address the leader that moves 
from quadrant IV back toward quadrant I, and is called a 
resurgent leader.  
In sum, the Freeman and McCormick model is helpful in 
visualizing the concepts and factors of the two variables 
described earlier in this chapter. The descriptions 
17 
presented do not cover every scenario, nor will every 
leader fall into one of the four quadrants or follow one of 
the described routes. Nevertheless, Freeman and McCormick 
argue that a majority of cases will fit the model 
effectively. The model has proved useful for visualizing 
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III. A CHRONOLOGY OF ATTACKS AND TRENDS 
A. ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI BACKGROUND  
This presentation of the Zarqawi case study will begin 
with a timeline and chronology of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s 
life and activities. This chapter comprises a 
reconstruction of events from his childhood lifestyle 
through his incarceration in prison to his death in Iraq. 
This brief outline of his life was constructed from several 
sources in order to provide the reader with a background 
and understanding of the evolution of Zarqawi. In the few 
instances where the sources do not agree about dates or 
names, an attempt has been made to provide a plausible 
interpretation based on the veracity of the reporting. In 
the few cases where contradictions exist, both versions are 
presented. 
1. Chronology of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, one of the most-wanted 
terrorists following the events of 11 September, was born 
Ahmed Fadhil al-Khalayleh in the Jordanian town of Al-
Zarqah in October of 1966.8 In his youth, Zarqawi was a 
street thug in Zarqa, Jordan, where both unemployment and 
desperation were high. The city was overrun with 
Palestinian refugees, which contributed to the poor 
economic situation in much of Jordan outside of the capitol 
of Amman. Government social programs and public services 
were not sufficient for dealing with the high unemployment, 
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and Zarqawi blamed the Jordanian monarchy for the social 
and political problems of its citizens. Though, initially, 
he had blamed the Palestinian refugee population for his 
own poor socio-economic situation,9 he later sympathized 
with them, and began to blame the regime for their problems 
in Jordan. Zarqawi became convinced that the King of Jordan 
had betrayed the Palestinians by recognizing and 
negotiating with the Israeli state.10  
As a result of these new sympathies, Zarqawi soon 
found himself running in the same social circles as 
Palestinian youths, attending religious sermons in Zarqa’s 
Palestinian areas, and being influenced by their Islamist 
message. As Napoleoni describes them, the mosques in Zarqa 
at the time were “the core of sociopolitical identity where 
people meet to discuss their bleak destiny.”11 Zarqawi 
became more and more committed to this group of Islamists 
and was soon indoctrinated into the Islamist movement. 
Thus, it was through these social contacts that Zarqawi 
found his way into the Islamists’ camp. As Marc Sageman 
shows, in Understanding Terrorist Networks, it is through 
social contacts that individuals are most likely to become 
involved in organizations.12 Corina Johnson makes a similar 
argument in her article, “Roots of Terror,” where she 
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concludes, “Personal connections are of ultimate importance 
in recruitment regardless of region or ideology.”13  
Zarqawi spent most of his youth in that impoverished 
village and eventually dropped out of school. In his early 
teens he joined a gang, became involved with drugs, and was 
accused of sexual assault, arrested, and later sent to 
prison.14  After spending a brief period in prison, Zarqawi 
left Jordan and traveled to Afghanistan to participate in 
the anti-Soviet jihad. Unfortunately, Zarqawi did not 
arrive in Afghanistan until after the withdrawal of Soviet 
forces, which proved to be a bitter disappointment for 
him.15 
Zarqawi spent the next several years in Afghanistan, 
where he received militant training and participated in the 
factional fighting taking place between various Afghan 
warlords at that time. In 1993, Zarqawi returned to Jordan 
and soon was imprisoned once again for conspiring to 
overthrow the Jordanian monarchy.16 One of the first groups 
with which Zarqawi was associated was the Islamist Bayt al-
Imam, an association and participation that drew the 
attention of the Jordanian Intelligence Directorate (GID). 
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When Jordanian security forces broke up the outlawed group, 
Zarqawi was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for his 
participation.17 
It is unclear whether Zarqawi returned to Jordan after 
meeting the influential cleric, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, as 
Napoleoni says, or whether he met Maqdisi while imprisoned 
for his Islamist activities as described by Gunaratana. In 
either case, Zarqawi became very close to Maqdisi during 
their many years together in prison, and at some point 
Maqdisi became his principle spiritual and ideological 
inspiration. While in prison, Zarqawi spent several hours 
each day studying and memorizing chapters of the Qur’an, 
and was described later as a very well educated student.18 
Hamdi Murad, a former spiritual leader and now professor of 
Islamic studies in Al-Balqa, Jordan, describes Zarqawi 
during his prison years as “a very simple person, normal, 
looking for truth in his own way.”19 
It was through Zarqawi’s relationship with Maqdisi 
that Zarqawi became radicalized and first became familiar 
with Usama Bin Laden. Maqdisi was a contemporary and close 
friend of Abu Qatada, the spiritual leader of Al Qaeda;20 it 
is possible that Zarqawi was able to establish a meeting 
with bin Laden through Maqdisi’s personal ties with Abu 
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Qatada. Zarqawi quickly grasped the unique role personal 
physical interaction can play – at mosques, in prison, 
through political organizations or charities. Such 
associations were to become the backbone of Zarqawi’s 
recruiting and logistics network.  
In the spring of 1999 Zarqawi was released from prison 
under the national amnesty granted by King Abdullah after 
he took office.21 Shortly thereafter Zarqawi left Jordan and 
went to Peshawar, Pakistan, where he is said to have joined 
up with al Qaeda.22 It is unknown whether Zarqawi actually 
joined the al-Qaeda organization, or whether he only 
associated with members of al-Qaeda through several weak 
and informal ties. 
Zarqawi then returned to Afghanistan, where he set up 
a camp (which reportedly specialized in manufacturing 
poisons) near the western Afghan city of Herat. Zarqawi 
also began to develop relationships in the area and 
eventually established a very well developed network.23 
Zarqawi also gradually created a network of cells in Iran 
and in the northern Kurdish areas of Iraq through his 
contacts in the Islamic movement of Kurdistan and Ansar Al 
Islam.24 It was in early 2000 that Zarqawi reportedly met 
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with Usama Bin Laden near Khandahar.25 Zarqawi began running 
operations in this area that were complimentary to those of 
al Qaeda, an association that has caused many to conclude 
that Zarqawi conspired with and was partly responsible for 
the al Qaeda millennium plots to blow up the Radisson Hotel 
in Amman, Jordan.26 In November 2001, a Joint U.S.-Jordanian 
investigation accused Zarqawi of being part of the foiled 
Al-Qaeda plot.27 
By the summer of 2001 Zarqawi had taken control of 
several groups operating throughout Iraq, Iran, 
Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan. He also provided both 
logistical support and military training to numerous 
individuals and groups.  It was through those relationships 
that Zarqawi became familiar with the local Kurdish 
Islamist group, Ansar al Islam.28  
After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, it is believed 
that Zarqawi left the country and relocated to northern 
Iran and the border area between Iran and Iraq. The ties he 
established while running the training camps in Herat 
eventually facilitated this relocation from Herat to 
northern Iraq. There are several possible explanations why 
Zarqawi moved from Herat to northern Iraq. First, as noted 
above, Zarqawi had established weak ties to the area 
through the relationships he established while running the 
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training camps in Herat. And because of those ties, it is 
reasonable to suspect Zarqawi selected the area because of 
the relative security it provided. Others suggest that 
Zarqawi may have anticipated the U.S. invasion and 
therefore positioned himself in the area to take advantage 
of the situation. In any case, it is certain that after the 
fall of the Taliban, Zarqawi fled to the Kurdish areas of 
northern Iraq and immediately began to establish more 
training camps.29 
According to the Web site, globalsecurity.org, Kurdish 
militants associated with Zarqawi built training camps for 
making explosives and poisons in northern Iraq. It is also 
said that associates and possibly Zarqawi himself were 
running the camps as they prepared for what appeared to be 
an impending invasion by U.S. forces.30 Napoleoni says that 
in the summer of 2002 Zarqawi went secretly to Baghdad in 
order to make preparations for battle. Reports of Zarqawi’s 
presence in Baghdad pressured analysts to draw a direct 
line between Zarqawi, al-Qaeda, and the Saddam regime, 
information that may have contributed to the decision to 
invade Iraq.   
By February 2002, the Jordanians had convicted Zarqawi 
in absentia for his role in the millennium attacks and in 
the assassination of Yizahk Snir.  Following his 
conviction, Zarqawi was sentenced in absentia to life in 
prison.31  
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In late October of 2002, Ambassador Laurence Foley, 
from the U.S. Agency for International Development, was 
assassinated in Amman, Jordan.  Numerous sources implicated 
Zarqawi and his network in this attack.32  
In February 2003, Colin Powell addressed the UN 
Security Council and named Zarqawi as an associate of al-
Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden.  Powell's speech put 
Zarqawi's name in the spotlight for the first time and 
indicated that Zarqawi was the leader of an al Qaeda cell 
operating in Iraq with the implicit consent of the Iraqi 
regime.33 
Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, 
Zarqawi remained relatively elusive and quiet. The record 
shows that even though Zarqawi was preparing for battle 
against the United States, he avoided contact with 
coalition forces during the first several months of the 
occupation. This all changed in August 2003. 
At that time, Zarqawi was implicated in several high-
profile attacks. The first occurred on 19 August 2003 when 
a truck bomb exploded at the UN headquarters in Baghdad, 
which killed twenty-three people, including the top UN 
envoy, Sergio Vieira de Mello. As a result of this attack, 
the UN withdrew from Iraq.34 Later that same month, a car 
full of explosives was driven into the Imam Ali mosque in 
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Najaf,35 killing more than eighty people, including a 
leading Shi'ite cleric, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, 
the leader of the hard-line Supreme Council of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq.36 This attack on a Shi’ite holy site was 
Zarqawi’s first attempt at inciting sectarian violence. 
Zarqawi is also implicated in the truck bombing that month 
of the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad.37 
In late 2003, coordinated blasts from suicide car 
bombs, mortars, and planted explosives struck Shi’ite 
Muslim shrines in Karbala and Baghdad, killing at least 
181. U.S. authorities linked these attacks to Zarqawi and 
his network of operatives.38 In March 2004, several bombs 
rocked the Madrid train station killing a number of 
civilians. Zarqawi claimed responsibility, blaming the 
attack on Spain’s cooperation with U.S. forces in Iraq. The 
attack on the Madrid train station ultimately resulted in 
the withdrawal of Spanish forces from Iraq and facilitated 
a change in political parties within the Spanish 
government. Even though Zarqawi claimed responsibility for 
this attack it appears a group loosely associated with al 
Qaeda actually planned and executed the attack according to 
the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. 
In early April Jordanian intelligence uncovered a plot 
by Zarqawi to strike the headquarters of the General 
Intelligence Department in Amman with a chemical bomb. The 
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GID (Jordanian Intelligence) seized several trucks loaded 
with over twenty tons of chemical explosives.39 Even though 
the operation was unsuccessful, it suggested a change in 
Zarqawi’s strategy. Not only was Zarqawi inciting civil war 
in Iraq by attacking Shi’ite religious sites, conducting 
spectacular attacks on key infrastructure, and taking 
hostages, he was also demonstrating his willingness to 
expand the Jihad from Iraq to a more regional Jihad in an 
effort to effect the removal of what he perceived as 
apostate governments, establish sharia law, and develop a 
regional caliphate.40  
Throughout 2004 and 2005, Zarqawi and his group 
carried out brazen bombings, beheadings and other attacks. 
In April, Zarqawi kidnapped and beheaded an American 
citizen Nicholas Berg, in what was to be the first of 
several brutal executions. However, Zarqawi also faced 
several new challenges. Though many Sunni insurgents and 
foreigners in Zarqawi’s ranks were willing to conduct 
brutal attacks on the civilian population, a growing 
majority of Iraqis began to express anger at Zarqawi’s 
tactics. In a letter later discovered by U.S. forces, 
reported by Napoleoni, Zarqawi wrote to Usama bin Laden 
stating his belief that he had two options. Either he could 
stay in Iraq and continue the aggressive attack on 
Shi’ites, the coalition, and Iraqis who opposed his 
methods, or he could leave Iraq and move to a new location 
to wage Jihad against the near enemy from there.41  
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Throughout the summer of 2004, the targets that 
Zarqawi and his organization chose to attack all seemed to 
be people and things that symbolized stability and 
political progress. They used a car bomb to assassinate 
Abdel-Zahraa Othman, the president of the Iraqi governing 
council, while simultaneously targeting both military and 
police recruiting stations, busy markets, and police 
checkpoints throughout the city of Baghdad.42 The relentless 
attacks on political symbols, civil services, and 
government officials continued throughout the summer. 
Zarqawi’s intent was apparently to create as much panic and 
distrust in the local population as possible, so they would 
lose trust in the government and its ability to protect the 
people. Ultimately, he would use more coercive techniques 
to manipulate Sunni organizations into attacking his 
religious opponents. 
Zarqawi’s brutal kidnappings and beheadings continued 
through September and October, as he claimed responsibility 
for the kidnapping and beheading of three engineers – Jack 
Hensley, Jack Armstrong, and Kenneth Bigley – from the 
United States and the United Kingdom. By October, all were 
confirmed to have been beheaded by Zarqawi. Later that 
month another kidnap victim, Shosei Koda, 24, of Japan, was 
also found decapitated in Baghdad, and again Zarqawi and 
his group claimed responsibility.43   
In the fall of 2004, Zarqawi communicated with bin 
Laden and pledged his group’s allegiance.44 But that pledge 
did not reflect Zarqawi’s acceptance of the al Qaeda 
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ideology or the strategy of attacking only the far enemy. 
Zarqawi was relentless in his attacks on the Shi’ite 
population as he continued in his efforts to provoke civil 
war. Zarqawi’s primary targets were Iraqi Shi’ites. He 
would commit to attacking the far enemy only when 
convenient targets of opportunity presented themselves, 
thus fulfilling his obligations to the greater al Qaeda.  
The brutal attacks organized by Zarqawi and his 
network continued in December with the bombings of Shi’ite 
shrines in Najaf and Karbala.45 Characteristically, he 
pursued operations that were spectacular in mass and 
symbolism. Attacks on a funeral procession in Najaf and the 
main bus station in nearby Karbala killed at least sixty 
people in the Shi’ite holy cities. The attacks, which 
struck the center of the Shi’ite religious institutions in 
Iraq were, from a military perspective, strikes at the 
heart of the enemy. This kind of attack occurred over and 
over, with Zarqawi directing attacks that were spectacular 
in effect and resulted in heavy media coverage. 
By December, in a letter posted on the Internet, Usama 
bin Laden had embraced Zarqawi’s activities. “Let it be 
known, the brother mujahid AMZ is the emir of the AQ 
organization in the land of the Tigris and the Euphrates 
and the brother of the group in the country should swear to 
him an oath of obedience."46 With parliamentary elections 
scheduled for January 2005, Zarqawi called on Iraqis not to 
participate, referring to the elections as illegitimate and 
supported only by apostates. But his calls were largely 
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ignored, as large numbers of Iraqis turned out to vote in 
neighborhoods and cities all over the country.  
Zarqawi continued his campaign of terror, 
intimidation, and coercion into 2005. In February, a 
suicide car-bomber struck a crowd of Iraqi police and 
National Guard recruits in the southern city of Hillah, 
killing 125.47 Zarqawi and his associates not only continued 
targeting Shi’ites, but also announced that they would 
target any Sunnis who cooperated with the Iraqi government 
or supported the country's constitution.48 
In October, U.S. authorities released a letter 
allegedly written by al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman 
al-Zawahri, to Zarqawi. In it, Zawahri urges Zarqawi to 
stop killing ordinary Muslims,49 chastises him for his 
tactics, and encourages him to be more conscious of the 
targets he selects and the methods he uses. He appears to 
be concerned that Zarqawi might be alienating his base of 
support among the moderate Sunni tribes of Iraq and 
negatively influencing the base of support that al-Qaeda 
draws on.50 
On 9 November 2005, three hotels in the Jordanian 
capital of Amman were bombed simultaneously, and when 
Zarqawi claimed responsibility, he was immediately 
criticized throughout the Arab world in a backlash of 
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revulsion.51 The attack was widely derided in Jordan, 
especially after the revelation that one of the bombs had 
detonated amid and killed several Muslims attending a 
wedding reception.52 Some months after the Jordan hotel 
attacks, reports indicate that several Sunni insurgent 
groups agreed to reconcile with the Iraqi government. This 
rift among Zarqawi’s former allies may indicate that his 
tactics were causing some of the insurgents to turn against 
him and his network.  
In the most spectacular attack since the 2003 UN 
headquarters bombing, on February 22, 2006 Zarqawi’s group 
attacked the Golden Mosque in Samara, considered one of the 
most sacred Shi’ite holy sites in Iraq.53 As a target, the 
mosque was significant because it led to an immediate 
upsurge in sectarian violence that pushed the entire 
country to the brink of civil war; the attack was followed 
by several months of revenge killings throughout Iraq.54 
Finally, on 7 June 2006, U.S. aircraft killed Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and at least 
six others, including Abu Abdul-Rahman, who had been al-
Zarqawi's spiritual leader.  
In sum, many factors are involved in Zarqawi’s journey 
toward becoming a feared terrorist in the post–9/11 era. 
The social crisis that believed he had suffered through  
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ultimately facilitated his radicalization. And with his 
indoctrination into the radical Islamist community, 
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IV. PHASE I: FROM ADOLESCENCE TO AFGHANISTAN: 
ZARQAWI’S EARLY EXPERIENCE AND EVENTUAL 
RADICALIZATION  
A. ADOLESCENCE TO AFGHANISTAN 
This chapter covers a broad time span: Zarqawi’s 
youth, his early life in Jordan, his experiences in 
Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet jihad, his association 
and involvement with the radical Islamist group Tawhid, or 
Bayaat al Imam, his incarceration and subsequent 
radicalization in the al Suwaqah prison in Jordan, and his 
return to Afghanistan after his release. The section 
addresses some personal social issues that may have 
contributed to Zarqawi’s radicalization and the greater 
social issues surrounding the Palestinian issue and how 
they may have been incorporated into his ideological belief 
system.  
1. Inspirational 
During this lengthy phase of Zarqawi’s life, there are 
indications that the inspirational variable was the single 
most significant factor at this time.  It is during this 
phase that Zarqawi identifies with the Islamist movement 
and begins his radicalization; Zarqawi also becomes a 
member of the Salafi Islamist movement but is not a leader 
in the organization at this point.  This phase establishes 
the inspirational foundation Zarqawi will rely upon in 
future phases.  
a. Ideology 
In analyzing Zarqawi’s ideology, several 
questions must be answered in regard to Zarqawi’s 
ideological goals. For example, to what extent was Zarqawi 
solely responsible for describing the problems at hand, for 
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identifying the enemy, determining solutions, and dictating 
the means to address the issues? These questions are 
critical because, as we explained in Chapter II, the more a 
leader – in this case, Zarqawi – is solely responsible for 
these aspects (the variables), the higher his position on 
the inspirational axis.   
As we will show later, Zarqawi had a close 
relationship with Maqdisi. This suggests that other 
Islamist authors may have been the source of Zarqawi’s 
ideology rather than establishing his own ideology based 
solely on his own personal beliefs. Due to Zarqawi’s own 
lack of religious authority, his credibility among 
jihadists was relatively insignificant. And, because of his 
own lack of credibility, Zarqawi apparently leveraged 
Maqdisi’s credibility to gain support for his own jihadist 
ideology and subsequent justification for his violent 
terrorist strategy. As we will see, Zarqawi later drifted 
away from Maqdisi; as he did, he began to instigate subtle 
changes to the general jihadist ideology that legitimized 
his strategies. This shift in the overall control of 
ideology may have resulted in an increase in Zarqawi’s 
ideological centrality. During this phase, however, there 
is little evidence that Zarqawi was solely or even mainly 
responsible for the ideology driving the current Islamist 
movement. It was Maqdisi, as well as other Salafi authors, 
who were the inspiration and ideological source for 
Zarqawi.  
Zarqawi perceived the immediate problem 
encompassed a number of prevailing issues. First and 
foremost were the factors involved in the secular Jordanian 
monarchy’s repression of Islamists. Underlying and 
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complicating the general feeling of repression were the 
social issues concerning the large and increasing 
Palestinian population, and an inherent sense of despair 
within Zarqawi himself.55 In her book, Insurgent Iraq, 
Napoleoni characterizes Zarqawi’s immediate cause as 
“deliverance of Muslims from the humiliation of 
occupation.”56 The root cause he embraced, however, was the 
culmination of numerous factors and evolved over time. Each 
factor was essential and contributed to Zarqawi’s 
perception of underlying problems. Some of the factors 
involved were the “repression of Palestinians by King 
Hussein of Jordan,” the repression of the Islamist movement 
by secular Western governments, globalization, and a shift 
away from religion as the dominant form of governing.57  
At the root of the problem was Zarqawi’s 
conviction that the regime mostly benefited the monarchy, 
ignoring the needs of ordinary citizens. He disagreed with 
the Jordanian government’s pluralism and lack of religious 
doctrine in the governing of its citizens. Zarqawi was left 
wanting a more righteous, religious form of government that 
would support all Arabs and Muslims.  
But those perceptions were not unique to Zarqawi; 
a large Salafist population had identified the same 
problematic issues.  Because it was a shared, widespread  
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identification of the problem, Zarqawi is not considered a 
central figure in defining the issues confronted by the 
Islamist movement.  
For Zarqawi, the enemy was the Jordanian 
monarchy, and to a lesser extent, the West. This 
identification of the enemy was not unique to Zarqawi. The 
Salafi ideology also identifies apostate secular 
governments and the West as the enemy.58 Thus, Zarqawi was 
not a driving force in his identification of the enemy, for 
it was a common and unifying identification in Salafi 
ideology.  
To Zarqawi, the solution to the perceived problem 
of apostate or infidel regimes was simple. He adopted the 
position taken by both Sayyed Qutb and Zawahiri, as cited 
by Napoleoni. The solution to any government being accused 
of apostasy through the principle of “taqfir” was to make 
it the target of “revolutionary Jihad.”59 Because Salafi 
jihadists believe that some Arab and Islamic governments 
are guilty of apostasy for their collusion with Christian 
and Jewish governments, they perceive them as legitimate 
targets.60 Thus, Zarqawi applied the same principle and 
determined that armed revolutionary jihad against the 
Jordanian monarchy was a justifiable solution. It would 
free the Palestinians and Jordanian citizens from socio-
political repression and allow them to strike back at the 
Zionist Jewish “crusaders.” 
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In sum, therefore, in regard to this variable, we 
assess Zarqawi as having a low ideological centrality. 
Indeed, Fishman claims that Zarqawi’s ideological influence 
was actually insignificant; his greatest strength was his 
personal leadership skills.61 
b. Charisma 
The second factor used to determine Zarqawi’s 
leadership strength in terms of the inspirational variable 
is his charismatic value. Studies show that throughout his 
youth and his experience in Afghanistan he apparently had a 
significantly low level of charisma. As a street thug and 
petty criminal in Jordan, Zarqawi demonstrated little 
leadership talent. We attribute this lacking to the fact 
that at this point he had no deep-seated ideological 
convictions, no common cause with the radical Islamic 
movement, and thus no possible leadership motivations or 
positions.   
However, after Zarqawi was imprisoned with 
Maqdisi for their illegal Islamist activity, there was an 
observable change in Zarqawi’s personality and early signs 
of a budding charisma. And as Brian Fishman notes, his 
adoption of a “Gharib” identity bolstered those developing 
charismatic qualities.62 
Zarqawi’s transformation, which was physical as 
well as emotional and spiritual, occurred during his term 
in prison. During long periods of isolation Zarqawi 
physically transformed himself by strengthening his body, 
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which facilitated his change in character as well. As he 
became more physically dominating, he began to challenge 
the guards and often defended other inmates from their 
brutal practices. Napoleoni describes how Zarqawi would 
deliberately commit acts of noncompliance and thus 
willingly expose himself to the guards’ retribution so as 
to develop a reputation among the inmates.63 In her book 
Napoleoni cites many inmates’ descriptions evidencing 
Zarqawi’s acquiring of a devoted following of Jihadists in 
the prison, a transforming process that established him 
there at least as a leader.  
Through his prison experience, Zarqawi was 
transformed physically, mentally, and spiritually; it also 
nurtured a growing ability to influence and lead other 
jihadists. We assess Zarqawi’s overall charismatic strength 
as moderate to high based on the evidence that Zarqawi was 
able to influence other Islamists, both inside and outside 
the prison environment.  
2. Operational  
During the early stages of this phase, Zarqawi was 
operationally irrelevant. By the later stages, however, he 
was able to establish more operational control and 
increased his relevance with the young Islamist group he 
and Maqdisi had formed.  
There is some evidence that suggests that throughout 
this period Zarqawi grew in importance as a leader.64 
According to those accounts, Zarqawi first established 
himself as a leader after his departure from Jordan during 
his early experiences and contacts in Afghanistan. And, 
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they argue, after he met and established a relationship 
with Maqdisi, his abilities to lead gained the momentum 
that was to make him a vital Islamist leader.   
During Zarqawi and Maqdisi’s imprisonment for their 
involvement in an outlawed Islamist organization, Zarqawi 
immersed himself in the teachings of the Qur’an and Salafi 
ideology. Maqdisi took a back seat to Zarqawi and 
encouraged other political prisoners to follow Zarqawi’s 
lead, eventually establishing Zarqawi as the “emir” within 
Suwaqah prison.65  As Zarqawi developed an educated 
understanding of the Salafi ideology he became more 
respected.  The respect that Zarqawi earned led to his 
status as an emir within the prison and ultimately resulted 
in the establishing the foundation of his own small group.    
a. Strategic 
Napoleoni describes the transition of leadership 
that took place from Maqdisi to his protégé Zarqawi during 
their incarceration. Zarqawi was encouraged by Maqdisi to 
take on the leadership responsibilities of the Islamists, 
but in accepting that responsibility, he simply adopted the 
strategy of the previous leaders. He made no changes in the 
revolutionary strategy and continued to follow the same 
strategic vision as previous revolutionaries: violence and 
terrorism directed at “near” enemies. At the time, Zarqawi 
simply did not have a broad enough following with 
subordinate organizations to be able to dictate strategy. 
His development of strategic shifts in methods would come 
later in his evolution as a group leader.  
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b. Tactical 
For our purposes, it is critical to determine the 
level of direct tactical control that was demonstrated by 
Zarqawi and when that control was evidenced. It is not 
until the later stages of this phase, in his direction of a 
small group of Islamists as they planned attacks in Jordan, 
that Zarqawi eventually demonstrated some unilateral 
tactical control.  
c. Organizational 
Both Zarqawi and Maqdisi used their positions 
within the prison to encourage prisoners to join their 
organization and thus built up the membership.  As Zarqawi 
was thrust into the leadership role, Maqdisi became his 
spiritual advisor. One inmate explains, “They rejected the 
command of Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi, preferring Abu Musab al 
Zarqawi because of his strength and determination.”66 As 
time went by, Zarqawi continued to grow in his role of 
emir. One inmate interviewed by Fouad Hussein states, “Al-
Zarqawi’s emirate was among the strongest and most 
influential with those groups for organizational reasons, 
because it extended to all prison quarters and attracted a 
large number of inmates.”67 
What seems certain, therefore, is that Zarqawi 
experienced success in prison in recruiting, influencing, 
and leading prisoners. The development of these 
organizational skills, which established him as a leader, 
eventually also provided him with the means to leverage his 
release from prison. A significant number of the inmates  
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influenced by Zarqawi in prison later formed the core group 
of his Tawhid organization and thus joined in his fight 
against the Jordanian regime. 
In sum, through the relationships forged in 
Afghanistan and in Suwaqah prison, Zarqawi established the 
close ties that he would rely on throughout his career. He 
gradually became known as a skilled leader and 
organizational mastermind, and was able to establish close 
ties to other influential Islamists largely due to three 
factors. First, his close relationship with Maqdisi helped 
establish his credibility. Second, the leadership he 
displayed in prison became legendary, which in turn 
established his credibility after his release from prison. 
Finally, Zarqawi’s reputation as a devout Islamist and his 
willingness to suffer on behalf of his “Muslim brothers” 
encouraged recruits to the organization.   
During his initial time in Afghanistan and 
subsequent imprisonment in Jordan, Zarqawi learned the 
importance of establishing key relationships. He leveraged 
the reputation of several well-known Islamists and used 
those ties to give legitimacy to his own credentials. As a 
result, a number of his fellow jihadists were attracted to 
Zarqawi, and he was able to form loose networks of 
individuals that he would rely on upon his return to 
Afghanistan after his release from prison.   
In light of the overall evidence and anecdotal 
accounts, therefore, it is plausible to assess Zarqawi’s 
organizational prowess as significant and of a kind that 
would ultimately contribute greatly to his future success. 
Although it is difficult to measure and quantify this 
characteristic’s overall contribution to Zarqawi’s 
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leadership skills in terms of the operational variable, it 
is obvious that his organizational prowess did translate 
into a significant level of operational importance. 
B. PHASE 1 ASSESSMENT 
Based on the analysis of Zarqawi’s leadership 
qualities during Phase I, Zarqawi scores a “2” in both the 
composite operational variable as well as in the composite 
inspirational variable.  Figure 2 represents the overall 
assessment of both variables based on the composite 
assessment of the sub-variables. This phase establishes the 
foundation of Zarqawi’s future organizations, however, 
during this phase Zarqawi is simply an individual in a much 
larger Salafi Jihadist movement. Zarqawi is not 
personalizing the ideology nor is he able to directly 
control strategic choices for the greater Salafi movement.  
It is the lack of influence, ideologically, and the 
insignificant operational leadership that limit Zarqawi’s 
influence in this phase.  In addition to Zarqawi’s lack of 
influence throughout this period, Zarqawi also lacks 
personal uniqueness.  Zarqawi is not critical to the 
continued virility of the Salafi Jihadist movement nor does 
he demonstrate a critical inspirational or operational 
characteristic that is unique to him.  
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Figure 2.   Phase 1 ordinal evaluation of the Freeman 
and McCormick leadership variables 
 
 
An incorporation of the assessment outlined in Figure 
2 is visualized in Figure 3, which shows Zarqawi during the 
first phase in the fourth quadrant. Given the assumptions 
made in the design of the model, a leadership strike 
against or decapitation of Zarqawi at this point would 
result in only an insignificant decrease in the capacity of 
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Figure 3.   Phase 1 assessment of Zarqawi as applied to 





V. PHASE II: FROM PRISON TO THE DEFEAT OF THE 
TALIBAN: ZARQAWI’S EARLY ORGANIZATIONS AND 
AFFILIATIONS  
A. FROM PRISON TO HERAT 
In May 1999, Zarqawi and Maqdisi were released from 
the al-Sulwaqa prison through an amnesty program 
established by King Abdullah. Shortly after their release, 
Zarqawi traveled to Pakistan where he was later arrested 
for having a forged visa. After spending time in jail, he 
was forced to move to Afghanistan where he settled down and 
began to establish connections with a small group of 
Palestinians and Jordanians. Shortly after his arrival, 
Usama Bin Laden encouraged Zarqawi to move to Herat, where 
he then established a training camp for Jordanian, 
Palestinian, and Syrian fighters. After the U.S. invasion 
of Afghanistan, Zarqawi moved on to northern Iraq where he 
began to establish a network of Islamists in the Kurdish-
controlled regions of northern Iraq and Iran.  
1. Inspirational 
After Zarqawi is released from prison and returns to 
Afghanistan, there were subtle but observable changes in 
his leadership abilities in terms of the inspirational 
variable, both in ideology and charisma.  For the most part 
Zarqawi was still focused on the removal of the apostate 
regime ruling Jordan.  However, because of the influence of 
Maqdisi and the radicalization from his prison experience, 
Zarqawi is transformed into a radical jihadist with visions 
of an Islamist revolution throughout the Arab world.  
Zarqawi undergoes a subtle shift from a nationalist 
Jihadist to a trans-national Islamist by taking more 
central control of the Salafi ideology that he learned from 
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Maqdisi. Throughout this phase, Zarqawi continued to 
establish himself as a key figure in the re-definition and 
manipulation of the Salafi ideology so that it would better 
justify the struggle to establish a transnational 
caliphate.  
a. Ideology 
After Zarqawi was released from prison he faced a 
decision. If he chose to remain in Jordan, he would have to 
earn a legitimate living and avoid the Islamists and the 
Salafist Jihad or face re-incarceration at the hands of the 
GID. However, Zarqawi knew that if he desired to continue 
his Jihad against the infidels and apostates, he would have 
to leave his home country of Jordan. Faced with this 
decision, Zarqawi moved to Pakistan where he could 
reestablish the connections he had made on his first trip 
to the region.68 It is clear that, at the time, Zarqawi 
followed a clearly established ideology according to the 
tenets of Salafism, not his own individual ideological 
interpretation of Islam. However, as someone who was well 
educated in Salafist ideology, Zarqawi soon became the 
center of inspiration and ideology for the close-knit group 
of Palestinians and Jordanians who found themselves in 
Afghanistan wanting to carry on the Jihad. 69  
The Salafi ideology was of course not unique to 
Zarqawi. It was grounded in the teachings of respected 
Islamist leaders like Maqdisi and Azzam. Zarqawi simply 
used their ideology to give legitimacy to his own form of 
Salafism. While Zarqawi’s version did not differ in 
substance from the espoused version of Salafism, he used it 
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to re-identify the source of the central social and 
political problem, as perceived by the Jihadists, and to 
justify the legitimacy of violent means for confronting the 
enemy. The main tool he used to justify those means was by 
designating Muslims’ enemies as “taqfir.”70  
What is clear is that even though Zarqawi modeled 
his organization on al-Qaeda, he relied on his own 
interpretation of the Salafi ideology in establishing his 
operational strategy as well as Zawahiri’s justification 
for the use of suicide missions as legitimate and 
effective.  
Zarqawi was driven by his desire to see the 
apostate regimes of the region replaced by Islamists, which 
would ensure a society that was ruled by Sharia. It was the 
Jordanian monarchy’s repression of political activists, 
ignorance of the Palestinian problem, and appeasement of 
Jewish and Western societies that Zarqawi was determined to 
stop. Zarqawi did not use the Salafi ideology to justify 
his own perceptions; rather, he identified with the authors 
of Salafism’s view of the problem and their justification 
of jihad to address it. 
Zarqawi manipulated the existing ideology in ways 
that justified expanding notions of the enemy to include 
Muslims he considered apostates and claimed that Muslims 
who were guilty of taqfir were legitimate targets of the 
jihad, thereby, enlarging the definition of legitimate 
enemies of the jihad.71 In effect, he could now direct 
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attacks against whomever he determined to be an enemy. 
Clearly, Zarqawi was leveraging his increasing influence 
with jihadists to control and dictate elements of the 
Salafi ideology.  
The solution to the problem, as Zarqawi and the 
Islamists saw it, was the removal of the apostate regimes 
in the Arab world. As Michael Radu puts it, their solution 
was the “expulsion of foreign forces and influences from 
Islamic societies, and ultimately, the creation of an 
Islamic state ruled by Sharia law.” As Radu explains, 
Zarqawi believed that the solution was rooted in the 
Islamic principle of “tawhid,” the unity of god and Islam 
as an all-encompassing religious, political, and social 
system.72   
As Zarqawi slowly formed his own small group, he 
adopted or at least in essence agreed with the greater 
Islamist community concerning the problem’s ultimate 
solution. Zarqawi had very little real influence on 
determining and defining the solution. Rather, he simply 
based his own solution on that of al-Qaeda and other 
Islamist groups.  
Zarqawi believed success could be achieved 
through violent jihad and the use of terrorism. To justify 
that conviction, he turned to the religious scholars. Well 
aware that he lacked the religious legitimacy required to 
call for violent jihad against his enemy, Zarqawi called 
upon the respected Salafi religious scholars for 
validation.73 He established a network of groups that were 
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ideologically homogenous, and once that support system was 
in place, Zarqawi was ready to operationalize his strategy 
and begin to overtly and violently attack the state.74  
Although Zarqawi was unable to dictate legitimate means to 
achieve the solution throughout the entire phase, there is 
a subtle, observable, shift as Zarqawi embraces suicide 
bombings as a legitimate.  The legitimacy of suicide 
attacks is not unique to Zarqawi; Zawahiri has already 
addressed the issue of legitimacy of suicide attacks and 
determined the use of suicide attacks to be justified.   
b. Charisma 
Many others shared the ideology, but few were 
natural leaders with the charismatic qualities to mobilize 
large numbers with few resources.75 In Bin Laden’s case 
influence came from his endless resources. In Zarqawi’s 
case, what he offered was more intangible. Yet, in the end, 
he was probably as successful as Bin Laden with much less 
financial and material support.  
Early on, Zarqawi had taken the nom de guerre, 
al-Gharib, or the “Stranger”. His adoption of that persona 
appealed to many jihadists, and he used it to “explain the 
disadvantaged political position of Jihadists.”76 To other 
jihadists, the implications behind the name “Stranger” were 
appealing, and Zarqawi made good use of them to justify 
their struggle while at the same time insulating the group 
from external criticism and implicitly denigrating the 
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masses that did not belong.77 Zarqawi’s “Stranger” persona 
and personal charisma provided the group with both a leader 
and an explanation for the alienation jihadists face. While 
Zarqawi adopted the use of terrorism and suicide bombing 
from Zawahiri, it was Zarqawi’s personal influence and 
charisma that convinced his operatives that suicide was not 
only effective, but also legitimate. In this regard, 
therefore, we rate the ability and personal leadership 
qualities of Zarqawi as critical to founding a small group 
in Afghanistan.   
2. Operational 
a. Strategic 
In terms of the operational variable, we see a 
dramatic increase in nearly all facets of Zarqawi’s control 
during this phase. He established the strategic vision for 
the groups he led and tactically increased his direct 
participation within the organizations as he dictated 
operations at that level.  
Zarqawi’s strategy was to attack the state.  
However, Zarqawi developed an indirect approach designed 
for attacking the ruling Arab regimes in Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Iraq rather than a direct approach.  The 
indirect approach Zarqawi developed was to attack regimes 
through unconventional attacks and through the use of 
terrorism.  Zarqawi understood that his organization would 
not be successful attacking the state through conventional 
operations.  Zarqawi’s group did not possess sufficient 
strength or resources to overtly challenge the state, 
therefore the indirect, unconventional method appealed to 
Zarqawi and his group.                       
77 Fishman, After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in 
Iraq, 19. 
53 
Recruits trained in the Herat camps were intended 
to infiltrate Jordan for the purpose of toppling the 
apostate regime. Zarqawi’s strategy was basic terrorism: 
the use of suicide bombers. In a documentary produced by 
the French and German Arte TV, Anas Sheik Aman indicates 
clearly how the Herat training camp was intended to prepare 
recruits for suicide missions.78 This appears to be the 
first evidence that Zarqawi was controlling and 
implementing an organizational strategy consisting of 
indirect attacks against apostate regimes through the use 
of suicide bombings. Zarqawi was later to use this same 
indirect strategy in Iraq. 
b. Tactical 
As part of the indoctrination of young Islamists, 
Zarqawi trained recruits to return to their home countries 
and perpetrate attacks against the state. He exercised 
tactical control by teaching the recruits to select targets 
based on their institutional significance. Zarqawi copied 
Zawahiri’s own transition from military techniques to 
terror tactics and the use of suicide bombings as the most 
effective tool of terrorism.79  
As an example of Zarqawi’s direct control over 
targets in this phase, he planned a chemical attack in 2004 
against the Jordanian Intelligence headquarters by 
dictating the target to his operatives.  Zarqawi wanted to 
retaliate against the state intelligence institution as he 
felt they were responsible for building the case that 
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incarcerated him.80  By directing an attack against a 
specific target Zarqawi demonstrated his ability to not 
only determine the strategy, he also determined the target 
of the attack.  Thus it is plausible to conclude that 
subsequent attacks in Jordan were a direct result of 
training received in the Herat camp. It is equally 
plausible to think that Zarqawi directly controlled 
subsequent tactical-level operations against apostate 
regimes. However, the information supporting these 
conclusions is contradictory.81  
There are several examples of Zarqawi organizing 
and directing suicide attacks targeting state institutions 
throughout the region.  Many of the attacks that Zarqawi 
organized and directed never fully matured; however, the 
operational direction to conduct attacks originated with 
Zarqawi while he was organizing small groups in his Herat 
training camp.  There are several examples of Zarqawi 
directing attacks throughout the region, in addition to the 
attack against the GID headquarters, Brissard also 
indicates Zarqawi directed the assassination of Ali Berjak, 
head of counterterrorist operations in the GID.82 Other 
examples include Zarqawi’s supposed planning of the  
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millennium plots directed at Western hotels in Amman as 
well as Zarqawi’s implication in the assassination of U.S. 
diplomat Lawrence Foley.83  
Notably, although Zarqawi received funding from 
al-Qaeda for some operations, he retained his autonomy in 
deciding the target selection, timing, and method.84 This 
level of autonomy, despite al-Qaeda funding was significant 
and demonstrated the key role Zarqawi played in maintaining 
the group’s autonomous operational strategy. 
c. Organizational 
Zarqawi’s later success as a radical group leader 
can be traced back to the relationships he established 
through the Salafist networks, mosques, and friendship ties 
in Afghanistan. He was very skillful in promoting the 
reputation within the Salafi Jihadist camps that was to 
facilitate much of his future success. Former prison 
inmates and others who spent time with Zarqawi talk of his 
ability to organize individuals and to establish 
credibility through his demonstrated relationships with 
influential authors and advisors within the Islamist 
community.85   
As Zarqawi established himself in Herat, he 
slowly organized a loose network of contacts that he could 
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leverage for logistical and financial support.  Napoleoni 
addresses several theories concerning the source of that 
funding and resources, but she discounts the idea that 
Zarqawi received funding from the Pakistani Intelligence. 
Evidence does suggest, however, that Zarqawi received 
significant support from the Taliban.86  
Zarqawi leveraged his reputation in Afghanistan 
and was able to establish links and friendships with major 
players throughout Afghanistan, including Zawahiri and bin 
Laden. Zarqawi used those relationships to facilitate the 
establishment of his own groups, networks, and loose 
affiliations. Numerous Jihadists were attracted to the 
organization for various reasons. First, some differed with 
al Qaeda in ideology, some felt more comfortable and 
willing to trust a fellow Jordanian who shared Palestinian 
friendships and links.  Some were also attracted by the 
myth and iconic status that Zarqawi had attained through 
his contacts in prison and in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 
sum, through skillful manipulation of shared and trusted 
contacts, Zarqawi established himself and his organization 
in the region. 
When evaluated as a contributing factor of the 
operational variable, Zarqawi’s organizational skill pushes 
his position farther to the right on the operational axis. 
It is clear that at that time in his organization’s 
development, it was Zarqawi’s connections, relationships, 
and reputation that furthered the group’s capacity. There 
is little evidence to suggest that there was another 
individual with the equivalent organizational skills to  
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achieve the same success. Thus, we conclude that, at the 
time, Zarqawi was the crucial link to his organization’s 
future. 
B. PHASE 2 ASSESSMENT 
Our analysis of Phase 2, the period from Zarqawi’s 
imprisonment to the defeat of the Taliban, finds that the 
composite assessment of the inspirational variable in 
regard to Zarqawi’s leadership qualities is considerably 
higher than during Phase 1. There is a slight increase in 
the strength of the charismatic element and a demonstrated 
ability to directly control aspects of the ideological sub-
components.  
Once Zarqawi established his small network of 
operatives in Afghanistan, he experienced the luxury of 
being an autonomous leader of a small group. His autonomy 
and freedom to conduct operations of his choosing was 
critical to the organization’s independence. And in 
exercising it, Zarqawi demonstrated all three aspects of 
the tactical variable, choosing targets, determining 
timing, and ordering the methods, thereby manifesting the 
central role he had in the organization at that point.  
One consideration in evaluating leadership qualities 
that must be accounted for is a leader’s ability to 
replicate the capability in a subordinate. Because Zarqawi 
did not have any particular tactical skills, it could be 
argued that decision-making ability required at the 
tactical level to determine targets, timing, and methods 
could then be easily replicated by others within the group. 
However, our point is not that the tactical skill couldn’t 
be replicated, but that it was the skillful leadership and 
vision that Zarqawi demonstrated in maintaining the 
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autonomy of the group while making the necessary tactical 
decisions that was the critical component. 
For Phase 2, therefore, we assess the inspirational 
variable as moderate, a slight increase from Phase 1. In 
assessing the operational variable, the composite 
assessment increases significantly from Phase 1. This 
increase is based on evidence showing Zarqawi’s strong 
organizational contributions during this phase and the 
significance both at the time and for the future of his 
operational autonomy. Figure 4 represents our overall 
assessment of both variables based on the composite 
assessment of the sub-variables. 
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Figure 4.   Phase 2 ordinal evaluation of the Freeman 
and McCormick leadership variables 
 
An incorporation of the assessment outlined in Figure 
4 is visualized in Figure 5, which shows Zarqawi during the 
second phase in the first quadrant. Thus, during that 
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period, Zarqawi demonstrated a critical significance on the 
operational axis. This increased significance can be 
accounted for by considering two significant attributes: 
Zarqawi’s organizational skill and his organization’s 
autonomous operational position. At this point, it is not 
clear whether Zarqawi’s organization could survive a 
decapatative strike against the leader. Although the 
organization has some hierarchical organization, it is 
heavily dependent on Zarqawi’s close personal relationships 
and ties to other jihad groups and on his skillful 
diplomacy with the al-Qaeda leadership in maintaining the 
group’s autonomy. Thus, decapitation of the leader at this 
point could possibly result in a significant decrease in 
the organization’s operational capacity and force the group 

























Zarqawi is assessed 
at a 4, 3 during the 
second stage of 
analysis.
 
Figure 5.   Phase 2 assessment of Zarqawi as applied to 
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VI. PHASE III: FROM KURDISTAN TO DEATH: THE ZARQAWI 
ORGANIZATION IN IRAQ;  
A. KURDISTAN TO DEATH 
In our analysis of the third and final phase of 
Zarqawi’s life, we will look at the period after Zarqawi 
fled Afghanistan, which covers his operations in Iraq and 
ends with his death in June 2006. In terms of Zarqawi’s 
leadership qualities, this final phase is a bit of a 
capstone, as he incorporates everything he has learned into 
his leadership methodology, skillfully leverages all of his 
relationships, dictates his own strategies, and is rewarded 
with an outpouring of support from the Islamist community 
in the region. 
The 2003 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan forced Zarqawi 
to flee from Herat to the Kurdish-controlled area of 
northern Iraq.87 Some speculate that Zarqawi moved there 
because he believed that the United States would 
subsequently invade Iraq. It may be more plausible to 
conclude that he left Herat for northern Iraq because that 
area was relatively ungoverned and thus would provide 
better protection for his group. In addition, Zarqawi had 
close ties with Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam), one 
of a number of Sunni Islamist groups based in the Kurdish-
controlled northern Iraq. Those relationships may have 
                     87 There is some discrepancy as to where Zarqawi went as the Northern 
Alliance closed in on Herat. Some accounts have Zarqawi fighting in 
Khandahar and Tora Bora along side Al Qaeda. While these are plausible 
events they are not critical to the analysis. There also appears to be 
some evidence that after Zarqawi departed Afghanistan that he spent 
time in Iran. However, this information is anecdotal and is not 
critical for this analysis. For simplicity, the second phase of 
analysis ends when Zarqawi departs Herat and the third phase of 
analysis will begin with Zarqawi establishing himself in Northern Iraq 
in the Kurdish areas.  
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allowed Zarqawi to easily integrate into the areas 
controlled by Salafi Islamist groups.88  
1. Inspirational 
In late 2001, Zarqawi moved to the Salafi-controlled 
area of Kurdistan, where he prepared to continue his jihad 
against apostates. This would eventually also become a 
fight against the United States and the forces of the 
coalition. Throughout this period, Zarqawi experienced 
significant success, which may be attributed to several 
factors. First, since the late twentieth century, a growing 
Salafi Islamist movement had been developing throughout 
Iraq.89 The increased acceptance of the Salafi ideology 
provided Zarqawi an ideologically similar population that 
he could leverage in his struggle to attack the far enemy 
and to establish a new Iraqi caliphate. Second, Zarqawi 
experienced significant success by manipulating the Salafi 
ideology to create his own version, which provided a means 
to mobilize the Sunnis against the Shi’ites. Lastly, 
Zarqawi was successful in mobilizing significant numbers of 
foreign jihadists for the insurgency in Iraq. Thus, in her 
article, “Profile of a Killer,” Napoleoni describes Zarqawi 
as “a new symbolic leader of the fight against America and 
a magnet for whoever was looking to be part of that 
struggle.”90 Zarqawi’s mythical appeal resulted in 
significant support from the Salafi and other Sunni 
populations throughout the region. It is that perception of 
his charismatic qualities that contributed heavily to our 
                     
88 Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New Generation, 106-
107. 
89 Ibid., 147. 
90 Napoleoni, Profile of a Killer, 37-43. 
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assessment of an increase in the significance of the 
inspirational variable throughout this final phase. 
a. Ideology 
The Salafist ideology continued to provide the 
foundation for Zarqawi’s group ideology and that of other 
associated movements in Iraq. However, Zarqawi’s strategic 
decision to wage war against the Shi’ite created a problem: 
it could not be supported by the traditional Salafist 
ideology that condemned waging war against fellow Muslims. 
Thus, if Zarqawi was to mobilize the Salafi and other Sunni 
populations in Iraq, he had to somehow convince his 
followers that waging war against fellow Muslims was 
religiously and ideologically justified. Convincing the 
Salafist and other Sunni populations would be difficult. 
Even Maqdisi and Usama bin Laden abhorred the idea of 
Muslims fighting Muslims.91 Nonetheless, Zarqawi was 
successful in his redefinition of parts of the Salafist 
ideology to include Shi’ites as enemies and legitimate 
targets. To justify this change, Zarqawi manipulated his 
groups and associates’ perceptions of the Shi’ite 
population, claiming that they were colluding with the U.S. 
coalition just as Shi’ites had allegedly conspired with the 
Mongols and Tartars in the thirteenth century to destroy 
Baghdad.92 Drawing on history as the basis of his claims, 
Zarqawi went on to apply the concept of “takfir,” (the act 
of identifying someone as a kafir, or unbeliever) to accuse 
                     
91 Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New Generation, 150. 
92 Ibid. 
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the Shi’ites of apostasy.93 As Gilles Keppel points out, in 
order to justify committing the Salafists and other Sunnis 
to a civil war, Zarqawi identified Shi’ites as al-rafadin, 
or rejectionists, and non-Muslims. According to Adel 
Darwish, Zarqawi had a pathological hatred of 
“unbelievers,” which in Zarqawi’s mind included all Muslims 
that did not share his Salafi beliefs.94 Through this 
manipulation and effective use of propaganda, redefining 
the enemy in terms of those he personally considered the 
“near” enemy, Zarqawi effectively modified the Salafi 
ideology. Prior to this phase, Zarqawi’s primary enemies 
had been the apostate Jordanian monarchy and the Jewish 
state of Israel. Now he was confronted with new enemies. 
First and foremost, the United States and its coalition 
forces presented a major impediment to the establishment of 
the caliphate. However, identifying the “far enemy” did not 
require an ideological shift unlike the radical ideological 
shift required to identify fellow brother Muslims as an 
enemy of the caliphate.  It was this control over the 
ideology that ultimately increased his central importance 
in terms of the inspirational variable of the leadership 
model.  
As the leader of the Islamist movement in Iraq, 
Zarqawi set the boundaries as to what methods were 
appropriate to achieve his ultimate goal, an Islamic 
                     93 note: “takfir”:This is the act of identifying someone as a kafir - 
unbeliever. Some Muslims believe that the right to do this lies only 
with God. Some, however, think that humans are allowed to make such an 
identification. Doing so has been an important part of Islamic 
fundamentalism - Muslims are not allowed to wage war on each other, but 
they can wage war on unbelievers. Thus, if a society or group can be 
labeled as unbelieving, it becomes religiously acceptable to engage in 
even armed battle with them. 
94 Darwish, After Zarqawi, 14. 
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caliphate. When the methods or the victims of operations 
violated basic Muslim principles, Zarqawi would solicit a 
spiritual advisor, either a respected scholar or a 
religious member, to issue a Fatwa that would justify the 
methods used. To the Muslim communities in the region there 
were several methods and targets that were especially 
unsavory and deplorable, and Zarqawi was harshly criticized 
for some of his methods. However, even as criticism mounted 
in the Arab world, he resolutely defended himself, 
justifying attacks against Shi’ites as a rooting out of “a 
cancer on the body of Islam.”95 With the invasion and 
presence of foreign invaders inside Iraq, Zarqawi was now 
able to identify both a “far” enemy and its occupation of 
Iraq as part of the problem. Zarqawi believed that external 
influences, pressures of a globalized world, and, most 
recently, the foreign occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
exploited Muslims.  These factors formed the foundation of 
the problem. 
For Zarqawi, achieving the ultimate solution 
required making changes through violent Jihad and attacking 
the Jihadists’ enemies both near and far. After his move to 
Iraq, Zarqawi was presented with a unique opportunity, by 
the presence of U.S. and coalition forces, to directly 
engage the West in fierce attacks. Conscious of his 
significant military disadvantage and lacking the ability 
to attack the enemy with conventional tactics, Zarqawi used 
a more indirect approach. His response to the enemy was to 
use suicide bombers and other forms of terrorist attacks.96 
                     
95 Darwish, After Zarqawi, 14. 
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The critical and most significant shift is in 
Zarqawi’s interpretation and justification of the enemy. It 
is at this point that Zarqawi was able to unilaterally 
determine new enemies of Salafism. This ability to identify 
and justify Muslim enemies evidences the high level of 
Zarqawi’s control at the time over the ideological 
component of the model’s inspirational variable. Zarqawi’s 
notable ability at this time to redefine the enemy strongly 
suggests that Zarqawi is either moving to or is already at 
a high level in regard to the inspirational variable. 
b. Charisma 
Most of the indicators of Zarqawi’s charisma 
during this phase come from anecdotal accounts and are 
difficult to measure and quantify in terms of the 
inspirational variable. However, we had some direct 
(undocumented) communication with several members of 
Zarqawi’s organization, nearly all or whom admitted their 
admiration and respect for Zarqawi because of his personal 
character. They not only respected his leadership, but also 
his religious and spiritual authority. Their respect was 
apparently based on their experience of his knowledge of 
the Qur’an and his interpretation of Salafi ideology. In an 
interview conducted by Michael Radu, the Jordanian 
journalist, Abdullah Abu Rumman, who had met and knew 
Zarqawi personally, described him as “very impressive” and 
“very charismatic.”97 A 2006 Economist article gives an 
indication of Zarqawi’s personal likeability and his 
charismatic character. It points out that Zarqawi grew in  
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popularity amongst the jihadists because he led the Jihad 
in person, as compared to bin Laden and Zawahiri who were 
directing the Jihad from afar.   
Another aspect of Zarqawi’s charismatic appeal 
was his ability to elude capture. Jeffrey Fleishman 
describes how Zarqawi’s group, at one point, sought to 
portray him as the “Harry Houdini of Iraq, outwitting his 
American pursuers as he hides in towns scattered throughout 
the western desert.”98 All of these factors contributed to 
Zarqawi’s mystique and almost mythical presence. 
Nonetheless, for our purposes, the question of his charisma 
is still vague. Probably the best evidence of it comes from 
videos the U.S. military discovered in Iraq while pursuing 
him. The videos show Zarqawi as a kind of celebrity who is 
always at the center of attention. Many insurgents who were 
associated with his network in Iraq indicate that it was 
Zarqawi’s “hands on” and “personal” approach that inspired 
them to endorse his strategy.99   
When all of the anecdotal evidence is analyzed 
and evaluated, it is plausible to assess the charismatic 
element of Zarqawi’s leadership as a significant 
contribution in regard to the inspirational variable. It is 
impossible to say, of course, whether some other individual 
who professed the same ideology would have been able to 
mobilize the number of jihadists that Zarqawi did. But his 
charisma was an element of his character that other leaders 
                     
98 Jeffrey Fleishman, "THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ; U.S. Ponders Iraq Fight 
After Zarqawi; the Militant may have Suffered Grave Injuries. If He 
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with similar goals seemed to lack. Therefore, we conclude 
that, in respect to the charismatic element of Zarqawi’s 
leadership ability, it is a significant component of the 
inspirational variable. 
2. Operational 
At this point in the third phase of Zarqawi’s life, 
taking an indirect approach to reaching his goals proved to 
be the only option open for Zarqawi. Thus, in the early 
months of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi chose to not 
overtly attack coalition forces. Instead, he continued to 
develop his group infrastructure and to swell the ranks 
before changing strategies to overt attacks.100 
a. Strategic  
In Iraq, Zarqawi had decided on a two-front 
strategy. First, he would continue to attack U.S. and 
coalition troops in an attempt to force the “infidels” to 
leave Arab lands. His second strategic choice was to open a 
front against the Shi’ite. For Zarqawi, these choices, to 
target both U.S. forces and the Shi’ites, were not only 
strategic, but also personal.101   
It is especially noteworthy that, during this 
phase, Zarqawi made a conscious decision to directly and 
openly engage the Iraqi Shi’ite population. He is said to 
have believed that a civil war would continue the 
destabilizing of the country and break up the political 
process that was to some extent taking place. Apparently, 
it was also an attempt to delegitimize the political 
process by leveraging the Sunni Baathist community against                      
100 Napoleoni, Profile of a Killer, 37-43. 
101 Steven Brooke, "The Rise of Zarqawi: Is He the Next Bin Laden?" 
Weekly Standard 9, no. 37 (June 7, 2004), 14-15; Zarqawi’s decision to 
target the Shia was personal because of his own deep hatred for the 
Shia population. 
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participation in the election process. These aspects are 
all critical to our assessment of the operational variable 
in respect to Zarqawi’s leadership ability. To mobilize 
other Arab Sunnis to support the Sunni population in Iraq, 
Zarqawi chose a strategy intended to drive a wedge between 
the Shi’ites and Sunnis and “ultimately drag the [entire] 
Islamic nation into battle.”102  
Zarqawi’s second front was against the Americans. 
His purpose here was to erode the U.S. political and 
domestic support for the war in Iraq.  By increasing U.S. 
casualties Zarqawi believed the popular domestic support 
for the war could be eroded and force a U.S. withdrawal 
from Iraq. To mobilize foreign audiences against supporting 
the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, Zarqawi added kidnappings 
and beheadings to his strategic methodology. His followers 
attacked Shi’ite religious and political leaders as a means 
to undermine the political process and infrastructure as a 
means to delegitimize U.S., coalition, and Iraqi efforts to 
provide security and stability. 
b. Tactical  
Probably the most important issue for this 
analysis is the level of control Zarqawi had over tactical 
operations. While Zarqawi was not central to the tactical 
execution, he was very central in identifying tactical 
targets according to their strategic significance. 
Zarqawi’s meticulous selection of each target was based on 
his awareness of its political or religious significance 
and the public exposure the attack would generate. From his 
perspective, media exposure was paramount to the success of 
the operations. The resulting publicity contributed to the 
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fulfillment of other requirements of the network, such as 
recruiting and generating necessary resources without 
reliance on al-Qaeda. This independence allowed Zarqawi to 
stand firm without taking directions from bin Laden, since 
he was not reliant on him for logistical support.  
Zarqawi achieved tactical success in numerous 
operations that had a significant global impact. He 
directed the bombing of both the UN headquarters, which 
resulted in the withdrawal of the UN from Iraq because of a 
perceived lack of security in the region, and the Jordanian 
embassy in Baghdad.103 These were tactical operations with 
long-term strategic implications. Zarqawi also directed 
several attacks against Shi’ite religious institutions and 
establishments, by which he apparently hoped to fracture 
any Shi’ite-Sunni relationship and prevent an Iraqi 
nationalist movement from developing. The attacks seemed to 
encourage a civil war between the sects that would 
ultimately destroy any possibility of stability and 
security.   
Except for some operations that were executed 
through a decentralized authority, such as daily targets of 
opportunity, Zarqawi controlled and dictated the timing of 
major spectacular attacks such as the U.N HQ’s and the 
Jordanian Embassy bombings.   Zarqawi directed the timing 
of these attacks in order to maximize media exposure as 
well as timing the attack to coincide with political and 
civil instability.  By controlling the timing of the 
attacks Zarqawi maximized the dramatic effect and 
ultimately forced the U.N. to withdraw from Iraq.  Also, 
during the period leading up to elections in January of 
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2005, in an apparent effort to influence voter turnout and 
support of national elections, attacks on civil authority 
were prevalent. Zarqawi timed these attacks to contradict 
public statements about security, thereby indirectly 
coercing nonparticipation by the suspicious Sunni 
population. He also timed attacks against coalition 
military forces during periods when coalition members were 
facing heavy criticism at home for supporting the 
occupation. Zarqawi chose contractors and military members 
as targets for a similar reason, to capitalize on criticism 
and anti-war supporters in coalition domestic politics.   
In this phase there are several examples of how 
Zarqawi and his organization drifted from the core al Qaeda 
ideology. Most notably, in a letter in 2005 bin Laden’s 
second-in-command, Zawahiri, disagreed with Zarqawi’s 
methods and their effectiveness.104 However, Zarqawi, 
refusing to be influenced by the senior al-Qaeda 
leadership, did not alter his methodology until later, when 
al-Qaeda’s support became critical. He explained his 
Shi’ite strategy to the al-Qaeda leadership as a necessity 
to awaken the inattentive Sunnis and his targeting of the 
Shi’ites in religious, political and military depth as a 
means to provoke a backlash and mobilize the Sunnis.105 
However, eventually, after pledging his allegiance to the 
greater al-Qaeda, he was influenced to moderate his methods 
and consider the victims of his attacks. 
                     
104 "Text of Zarqawi Letter," 
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The information available indicates that Zarqawi 
was very much the primary decision-maker in selecting the 
targets, timing, and methods of attacks. The available 
evidence supports our assessment that Zarqawi’s leadership 
ability was relatively high in terms of the model’s 
operational variable. Zarqawi’s willingness to attack, 
kidnap, and behead civilians demonstrates his significant 
influence and control over key tactical decisions.  At this 
point, it does not appear that other leaders of the Salafi 
ideology would be willing to direct or justify attacks on 
other Muslims or grisly beheadings of civilian targets.  
These tactics appear to be unique to Zarqawi and could 
possibly represent unique characteristics that could not be 
replicated by other leaders if Zarqawi was captured or 
killed.  
c. Organizational 
Throughout all of Zarqawi’s experiences and 
travels he demonstrated a significant ability to leverage 
kinship and religious ties. The contacts he established 
enabled him to develop a very robust network throughout 
Iraq and the entire region. Zarqawi was able to leverage 
organizations throughout Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to 
finance and provide logistical support to his growing 
network. It is not surprising, therefore, that Napoleoni 
describes him as an able and gifted leader and organizer.106   
Evidence from the extensive reporting available 
indicates that Zarqawi had significant influence in respect 
to the operational components of the leadership model. As 
the organization grew in size, Zarqawi was less able to 
maintain direct control over operations. Zarqawi 
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decentralized operations by establishing local and regional 
emirs throughout Iraq. The regional emirs appointed local 
emirs to control military operations at the local level. 
Each emir commanded operational cells that were responsible 
for conducting military operations in the region. In 
addition to the local and regional emirs controlling 
military operations throughout Iraq, splinter groups 
conducted kidnappings in the name of al Qaeda in Iraq.  
Nonetheless, his dispersed and decentralized organization 
conducted operations based on their understanding of 
Zarqawi’s strategy and intent.107 Within his greater Iraqi 
network, Zarqawi also established several subordinate cells 
or networks, each of which was designated for specific 
tasks. There was a network of religious scholars that could 
issue fatwas justifying actions taken by the greater 
network. This cell was also responsible for providing 
spiritual guidance, not only to Zarqawi but also to members 
of the network as a means to ensure the maintenance of a 
homogenous ideology throughout. Zarqawi also established a 
media network that was responsible for the release of the 
propaganda that generated financial support and ensured 
that Zarqawi’s message would get published through print 
and electronic outlets.108  
Zarqawi’s organizational skills allowed for the 
creation of robust network operatives. As the network 
developed and institutionalized Zarqawi’s ideology and 
strategy, it naturally became more decentralized. As we 
have said, its effectiveness can be attributed to the close 
ties and relationships Zarqawi established throughout his                      
107 For more on this, see Brian Fishman, United States Military 
Academy, Countering Terrorism Center, Militant Ideology Atlas. 
108 Darwish, After Zarqawi, 14. 
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career. For friendship, kinship, and religious ties are 
critical to the establishment of such cohesive and 
effective operational networks. Zarqawi and his 
organizational skills were also critical to the network 
that he developed in Iraq, for it too depended on the close 
ties he had brokered. Zarqawi’s personal characteristics, 
his charismatic, ideological, and operational skill, were 
critical also to the success of the organization, and the 
ties between groups and other organizations would be 
difficult for any successor to replicate. Because of 
Zarqawi’s central role in organizing the network, we rate 
his value to the organization in regard to the model’s 
organization variable as quite significant. 
B. PHASE 3 ASSESSMENT 
In the final phase of our analysis, Zarqawi 
significantly increases in importance in nearly all 
aspects. However, as the size and the capacity of the 
organization increases, there is a corresponding increase 
in the decentralization of operations.  In response to the 
decentralization of the operational aspects, Zarqawi, in 
the late stages of the phase, declines along the 
operational axis moving him closer towards the second 
quadrant of the model. The decentralization of operations 
allowed his subordinate leadership to operate semi-
autonomously. In regard to the effectiveness of leadership 
decapitation, we would expect decapitation to become less 
effective as Zarqawi institutionalized the operational 
aspects. Figure 6 shows our assessment of Zarqawi’s central 
importance to the organization.  The assessment of Zarqawi 
in this phase is assessed holistically, however, in order 
to address the institutionalization of some operational 
factors in the late stages of the final phase, Zarqawi  
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begins a subtle shift to the left along the operational 
axis.  This subtle shift is visualized in Figure 7 but is 
not depicted in Figure 6.  
Phase 3
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Figure 6.   Phase 3 Ordinal evaluation of the Freeman 
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Figure 7.   Phase 3 assessment of Zarqawi as applied to 
the Terrorist Leadership Model.  (After: Freeman and 
McCormick) 
 
As Zarqawi moves to the highest point in the first 
quadrant, indicating a leader that is critical to the 
survivability of an organization, he also manages to 
decentralize and institutionalize some of the 
organizational and tactical factors.  By institutionalizing 
some operational factors, Zarqawi is able to reduce the 
vulnerability of the organization to a decapatative strike. 
In the late stages of phase III, the decentralization of 
operations corresponds to a subtle shift along the 
operational axis.  This subtle shift is represented in 
Figure 7; Zarqawi moves from the upper left part of 




VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. IS DECAPITATION AN EFFECTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM 
STRATEGY? 
Decapitation or leadership targeting is not an 
effective counter terrorism strategy as applied to this 
case.  If the desired end-state of the leadership targeting 
strategy is the defeat of the Zarqawi organization, 
leadership decapitation did not achieve its goal.  Zarqawi 
was killed in June 2006; the decapitation did result in a 
temporary decrease in operational capacity.  However, this 
decapitative strike did not defeat the Zarqawi 
organization.  The organization re-organized around the 
leadership of Ayub al-Masri who has slightly modified 
Zarqawi’s strategy but the organization still exists within 
Iraq in terms of membership, capacity, and ideology.109 Many 
scholars, analysts, and investigative reporters admit that 
even though al Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike, the 
organization continues to exist in much the same form as it 
existed prior to the strike that killed Zarqawi.110 
Interestingly, statistical data from the Terrorism 
Knowledge Base (TKB) indicate that the overall number of 
incidents executed by al-Qaeda in Iraq is significantly 
lower since al Zarqawi’s death.  Statistics provided by TKB 
indicate that al-Qaeda in Iraq conducted, on average, 4.5 
attacks per month over the period from March 2003 to June 
2006.  Since June 2006, al Qaeda in Iraq is averaging less 
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than one attack per month.111  This decrease in operational 
activity was anticipated, however, many believe al Qaeda in 
Iraq will slowly reorganize and reestablish an operational 
tempo close to that prior to Zarqawi’s death.  One factor 
that is not consistent throughout this window is U.S. 
security efforts.  It is possible that the decrease in 
operational attacks can be attributed to the increase in 
U.S. troops providing security in Iraq and not to a 
diminished capacity based on the death of Zarqawi. 
Zarqawi’s group in Iraq is still operationally viable 
even though there has been a decrease in effectiveness to 
date.  However, as discussed above, it is unclear at this 
point if the decrease in operational capacity is a result 
of the loss of the leader, the increased troop strength, or 
a modification of the inspirational and operational factors 
under new leadership.  Zarqawi’s organization may transform 
into a more moderate organization under the leadership of 
Ayub al-Masri and in the future may not resemble the 
Zarqawi organization, however, I do not believe this is 
justification or validation of a successful decapitation 
strategy.  
The assumption made by Freeman and McCormick is that a 
decapatative strike against a leader who demonstrates a 
high level of importance in the inspirational and 
operational axes could result in the defeat or 
marginalization of the group.  The basis of the assumption 
is that the organization is dependent on the leader; 
killing or arresting the leader could leave the 
                     111 The data Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(MIPT) uses is derived from the RAND corporation terrorism incident 
database.  The statistical data is compiled using various analytical 
tools found on the Terrorism Knowledge Base website, for more on this 
data please see http://www.tkb.org/AnalyticalTools.jsp 
79 
organization leaderless and incapacitated.  Freeman and 
McCormick address four secondary variables that also impact 
on the success of leadership targeting.112  The secondary 
factors may also have an impact on the success or failure 
of leadership targeting.  The four secondary variables are: 
1) effects on leaders, 2) effects on organizations, 3) 
reactions by various actors, and 4) issues of 
practicality.113 
In determining success or failure in the Zarqawi case, 
the secondary variables should also be considered.  The 
first variable to consider is to assess who will replace 
Zarqawi.  In this case, Ayub al-Masri was declared the 
successor to Zarqawi.  If leadership targeting is to be 
effective, successors should be less capable leaders.  A 
year after Zarqawi’s death it is still too early to 
determine if al-Masri is more or less capable as a leader. 
However, to date, al-Masri appears to be relatively 
successful in keeping the organization together.  Some 
indications point to Sunni Arabs breaking with al Qaeda in 
Iraq, this break can be explained by the ideological 
differences between the groups, not because al-Masri is a 
less effective leader.  The break between Iraqi Sunni’s and 
Zarqawi’s network was inevitable as the two groups are 
ideologically dissimilar and only created an alliance 
because of a shared common enemy. Second, what are the 
effects on organizations? This includes things like 
defense, decentralization and uncertainty.  In this case 
there was little adverse reaction, domestically or 
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internationally, toward the killing of Zarqawi. The next 
consideration that might impact the success or failure of 
targeted killing is the reactions by various actors.  In 
this case, the concern is determining if the targeted 
killing of Zarqawi was morally acceptable by the 
international community as well as the domestic audience. 
At this point, it appears that the death of Zarqawi did not 
significantly impact sympathizers.  Radical members of 
Zarqawi’s organization declared Zarqawi a martyr, however 
this claim did not translate into a significant outpouring 
of support or increased allegiance to the organization from 
outside actors.  The last consideration is the issue of 
practicality.  In the Zarqawi case practicality is not a 
critical consideration.  There are certainly questions of 
effectiveness and questions concerning the commitment of 
resources to leadership targeting.  However, the U.S 
military occupied Iraq, Zarqawi’s operational area.  As 
long as intelligence could determine Zarqawi’s location he 
could realistically be interdicted within minutes because 
of the availability and relative proximity of counter 
terrorist forces.        
The Zarqawi case study assesses Zarqawi as critical to 
the organization in both the inspirational and 
organizational axis in the final phase discussed in Chapter 
VI.  However, the decapitation of Zarqawi did not produce 
the expected results.  One explanation for this is that 
Zarqawi was able to institutionalize both the inspirational 
and operational factors at the same rate at which he 
increased in importance to the organization.  By 
institutionalizing the inspirational and operational 
aspects, the organization became less vulnerable to the 
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decapatative strike.  The second explanation is that the 
problem, addressed in Chapter IV, still provides the 
organization with a reason to exist and to continue to 
fight.  Nouri al-Maliki described Zarqawi’s death as a 
great day for Iraq; however, as a writer for the Economist 
magazine eloquently stated, “The safest bet this week is 
that, even without Mr. Zarqawi, the violence will go on 
until the rage that nourishes it has been uprooted”.114  
Based on the Zarqawi case study and applying the 
leadership model to this case, the results indicate that a 
decapitation strategy would result in a short-term drop in 
the effectiveness of Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq network. 
However, the long-term health of the network is based in 
the Salafi ideology.115  Therefore, leadership decapitation, 
overall, would not be an effective strategy in defeating 
this network.  Zarqawi possessed organizational skills, an 
ability to network throughout the Islamist population by 
leveraging social and kinship ties, a strong central figure 
in the operational variable and charismatic qualities that 
are difficult to replace.  However, Zarqawi is not the 
critical, central element to the success of the 
organization.  The willing pool of Salafi Jihadists to draw 
upon is not affected by the death of Zarqawi.116  The Salafi 
ideology is not generated through Zarqawi himself, rather 
                     
114 Economist, "Leaders: After Zarqawi - After Zarqawi; Iraq," The 
Economist 379, no. 8481 (June 10, 2006), 9, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1052982431&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=
309&VName=PQD. 
115 White, The Death of Zarqawi: Organizational and Operational 
Implications for the Insurgency, 3. 
116 Chris Heffelfinger, "The Ideological Voices of the Jihadi 
Movement," 
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370233 
(accessed September 2007). 
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Zarqawi is a kind of messenger that operationalizes the 
Salafi ideology proselytized by the religious figures. In 
effect, the Salafi ideology is not a brainchild of Zarqawi 
and thereby removing Zarqawi does not remove the source of 
the inspiration.  Operationally, Zarqawi was effective in 
articulating a strategy that enabled operations. One has to 
ask; if Zarqawi is killed will someone else be able to fill 
the operational void created by his death?  In the case of 
Zarqawi, he did not posses a critical skill that no one 
else could have replicated it also appears that Ayub al-
Masri has been able to replace Zarqawi.  Many even believe 
that al-Masri may even be a more formidable adversary vis-
à-vis al Zarqawi and may be more successful because he has 
taken a more moderate position with regard to attacks on 
civilians and justification of attacks on Shia Muslims. 117  
This also might indicate that as al-Masri takes control of 
the organization he will transform the Zarqawi network into 
a network more in line with the greater al-Qaeda.  If this 
is true, was Zarqawi’s decapitation a successful strategy?  
I would argue there are subtle differences between the 
organization led by Zarqawi and the organization now being 
led by al-Masri. However, these subtle differences do not 
make the al-Masri network a new organization. In this case 
only sustained decapitation would possibly result in 
success.  The cost of participation has to be escalated to 
the point that not only would future leaders be deterred 
from ascending to the leadership position, an effective 
strategy would also have to focus on fracturing the 
legitimacy of the organization and deter future 
participation and allegiance to the ideology.  In order to 
                     
117 Gartenstein-Ross and Dabruzzi, Jihad's New Leaders - Middle East 
Quarterly. 
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deter support and participation another alternative or 
solution has to be of value to potential recruits and 
supporters of the ideology.  In short, the root cause has 
to be identified and addressed with moderates offering a 
solution to the problem.  Until the problem is addressed 
and the radical Islamist population feels the issues are 
adequately resolved the source of the frustration will 
continue to exist and will only lead to more radical 
solutions. 
B. SECOND AND THIRD ORDER EFFECTS AND BENEFITS 
If a decapitation strategy is ineffective in this 
case, what are the associated benefits that justify 
continuing a decapitation strategy? 
1. Intelligence and Visibility 
The foremost reason to pursue a decapitation strategy, 
in this case, is to establish the depth of the network.  By 
pursuing this strategy the military organization tasked 
with the kill or capture mission of Zarqawi must anticipate 
where and when Zarqawi will be in a specific location in 
order to direct forces to that location for interdiction.  
In order to determine where to interdict Zarqawi, multiple 
levels of operatives had to be identified, their links to 
Zarqawi established, the relationship that operative or 
that cell had to Zarqawi, and the access that operative had 
to Zarqawi.  Through the pursuit of this information that 
is critical to the eventual kill or capture of Zarqawi, 
relevant and important other links are established that 
reveal the breadth and depth of Zarqawi’s contacts.  This 
information is critical for other governmental agencies in 
their diplomatic pursuits of criminal and terrorist 
networks throughout the region and even those same networks 
and contacts that may reside within the United States.  
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Essentially, by exposing the entire network, the military 
and other governmental organizations are able to establish 
links that facilitate the arrest or targeting of other 
terrorist throughout the region and thereby furthered the 
safety and security of not only coalition members 
participating in Iraq but provided a certain amount of 
security in support of the homeland defense as well as 
possibly the prevention or interdiction of future planned 
attacks.  Significant intelligence is gathered on the 
entire breadth and depth of the radical Islamist Salafi 
network, resulting in an increased level of global security 
and stability. 
2. Domestic Morale 
Regardless of the effectiveness of the decapitation 
strategy, a significant blow to the al-Qaeda network in 
Iraq was delivered when Zarqawi was killed in June 2006.  
Foremost, increased morale, not only for the troops that 
dedicated themselves toward the eventual operation that 
killed Zarqawi, but it can also be considered a morale 
boost for the American public.  The public, for or against 
the war, wanted some kind of justice and wanted to see the 
man who was directly responsible for the grisly atrocities 
in Iraq brought to some kind of justice.  With the 
operation that killed Zarqawi, the public was given that 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ali, Farhana. "Zarqawi Death Won't End War." UPI. 
http://www.rand.org/commentary/061006UPI.html 
(accessed September 2007). 
Brisard, Jean-Charles. Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda 
2005. 
Brooke, Steven. "The Rise of Zarqawi: Is He the Next Bin 
Laden?" Weekly Standard 9, no. 37 (June 7, 2004): 14-
15. 
Darwish, Adel. "After Zarqawi." Middle East, no. 369 (July 
2006): 14. 
Economist. "Leaders: After Zarqawi - After Zarqawi; Iraq." 
The Economist 379, no. 8481 (June 10, 2006): 9. 
Fishman, Brian. "After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of 
Al Qaeda in Iraq." The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 4 
(Autumn 2006): 19. 
Fleishman, Jeffrey. "THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ; U.S. Ponders 
Iraq Fight After Zarqawi; the Militant may have 
Suffered Grave Injuries. If He Dies, the Insurgency's 
Divisions could Widen." Los Angeles Times, May 28, 
2005. 
Freeman, Michael and Gordon McCormick. Leadership Targeting 
of Terrorist Groups: A Strategic Assessment, 
Unpublished. 
Fresco, Adam. "Briefing: Al-Zarqawi's Toll of Atrocities - 
Times Online." Times online. 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/artic
le672808.ece (accessed September 2007). 
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed and Dabruzzi, Kyle. "Jihad's New 
Leaders - Middle East Quarterly." 
http://www.meforum.org/article/1710 (accessed 
September 2007). 
Global security org, profile. "Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi." 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/abu_mu
sab_al-zarqawi.htm (accessed September 2007). 
86 
Gunaratana, Rohan. "Abu Musab Zarqawi: A New Generation 
Terrorist Leader." Instituite of Defense and Strategic 
Studies (July 2004).  
http://www.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/publications/Perspective/ID
SS252004.pdf (accessed February 2007). 
Haider, Hind. What Makes Zarqawi Tick? United States 
Institute of Peace, 2006. 
Heffelfinger, Chris. "The Ideological Voices of the Jihadi 
Movement." 
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articl
eid=2370233 (accessed September 2007). 
"Iraq: A Timeline of Abu Mus'Ab Al-Zarqawi." 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/20
06/06/iraq-060609-rferl01.htm (accessed September 
2007). 
Jenkins, Paul. "Al Qaeda in Iraq: Redefining Terror." World 
Today 62, no. 8-9 (August/September 2006): 7-8. 
Johnson, Corina. "Roots of Terror." Women in International 
Security Georgetown University Center for Peace & 
Security Studies Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign 
Service, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2007. 
Leiken, Robert S. and Steven Brooke. "Who is Abu Zarqawi?" 
The Weekly Standard 9, no. 35 (May 24, 2004): 25. 
Militant Ideology Atlas. Combating Terrorism Center US 
Military Academy, November 2006. 
Napoleoni, Loretta. Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New 
Generation. 1st North American ed. New York: Seven 
Stories Press, 2005. 
———. "Profile of a Killer." Foreign Policy no. 151 
(November-December 2005): 37-43. 
Radu, Michael. "E-Notes: The Demise of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi 
- FPRI." 
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20060608.americawar.radu.al
-zarqawi.html (accessed September 2007). 
Riedel, Bruce. "Al Qaeda Strikes Back." Foreign Affairs 86, 
no. 3 (May/June 2007): 24. 
87 
Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 
"Text of Zarqawi Letter." 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/20
04/02/040212-al-zarqawi.htm (accessed September 2007). 
White, Jeffrey. The Death of Zarqawi: Organizational and 
Operational Implications for the Insurgency. 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
89 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  
 
1. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  
 
2. Joint Special Operations University 
MacDill Air Force Base 
Tampa, FL 
 




4. United States Special Operations Command, J-7 
MacDill Air Force Base 
Tampa, FL 
 
5. United States Special Operation Command, Librarian 
MacDill Air Force Base 
Tampa, FL 
 
 
 
 
 
